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Neural studies of creativity have yielded relatively little consistent results. For example, in
functional neuroanatomical studies, the prefrontal cortex (PFC) has often been implicated
as a critical neural substrate. However, results in electrophysiological (EEG) studies have
been inconsistent as to the role of the PFC. EEG results have more often implicated
widespread alpha synchronization, particularly in posterior regions, in creative cognition.
Recent fMRI evidence has indicated that the PFC may be activated as a part of
and together with other components of a deliberate control brain network. Controlled
processing is neurologically dissociated from, but may co-occur with, spontaneous
cognition mediated by a subset of the default-mode network (e.g., the angular gyrus
[BA 39] in the posterior parietal cortex, which has been increasingly implicated in
creative cognition). When the demand for controlled processing is substantially increased,
default-mode processing may be suppressed. There is now preliminary evidence to
suggest an association between alpha synchronization and default-mode processing.
Creative cognition likely emerges from an optimal balance between spontaneous
processing and controlled processing.
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The advent of neuroimaging methodologies in the last two
decades has seen an increase in studies of creativity from a
cognitive neuroscience perspective. However, there is hitherto
relatively little evidence for a clear and consistent pattern
of brain activity that is associated with creative information
processing in general, or with a particular proposed stage of
it (see e.g., Arden et al., 2010; Dietrich and Kanso, 2010;
Kaufman et al., 2010; Sawyer, 2011). Recent cognitive neuro-
science evidence has supported the role that a subset of the
brain’s default mode network (DMN) plays in spontaneous
cognition (e.g., the angular gyrus, Brodmann Area [BA] 39,
in the posterior parietal cortex; Mok, 2012). Default network
activity may be suppressed when there is a substantial demand
for controlled processing. However, spontaneous processing
and controlled processing may co-occur. This article aims to
highlight how these findings may be integrated with the exist-
ing creative cognition literature to offer a preliminary unifying
perspective.
INTEGRATION WITH EXISTING THEMES
Neural studies of creativity have typically employed the stan-
dard, bipartite definition of creativity (Runco and Jaeger, 2012).
Creativity is regarded as an ability that enables one to produce
behavior or work that is novel and useful; useful creative behaviors
and products would be appropriate and relevant to one’s social
context (e.g., Amabile, 1982; Sternberg and Lubart, 1999). The
focus is to illuminate the neurocognitive operations that occur
during the creative process (Kaufman et al., 2010). In experimental
studies of creativity, tests of divergent thinking have been widely
used. It has been reasoned that cognitive processes that give
rise to creative ideas are more likely generative and divergent in
nature, where the thinker searches in various directions, leading
to numerous varied possibilities and possibly novel combinations.
Commonly used tests of divergent thinking include variants of the
Alternate Uses Test (AUT), which requires the respondent to self-
generate as many alternative or unusual uses for common objects
as possible such as a paper clip or a brick; and the Torrance Tests
of Creative Thinking (TTCT; Torrance, 1974), which is a battery
of standardized verbal and figural tests. Despite a relative lack of
consistent results, functional neuroanatomical studies using func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) or positron emission
tomography (PET) have often implicated the prefrontal cortex
(PFC) as a critical neuroanatomical substrate of divergent think-
ing (e.g., Folley and Park, 2005; Goel and Vartanian, 2005; see
Dietrich and Kanso, 2010). The PFC has long been thought to play
a critical role in top-down cognitive control (Miller and Cohen,
2001). It has, thus, been deemed essential for common cognitive
functions such as working memory, attentional control, cognitive
flexibility and cognitive evaluation, all of which are thought to
be important to creative information processing (Dietrich, 2004).
However, when brain electrical activity was measured using elec-
troencephalography (EEG), the divergent thinking paradigm did
not yield comparable results in frontal regions (see e.g., Dietrich
and Kanso, 2010).
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In another line of cognitive neuroscience research, it has been
demonstrated that the PFC, especially the dorsolateral aspect, may
be activated as a part of and together with other components of
(what is now known as) the multiple-demand network1 (Duncan,
2006). This form of cognitive processing is more deliberately
engaged, attention-demanding, controlled and goal-directed, and
is neurologically dissociated from, but may be concurrently expe-
rienced with, more spontaneous cognition mediated by a subset of
the brain’s DMN (Mok, 2012). A default brain region that is par-
ticularly involved in spontaneous processing (e.g., spontaneous
prospection) is the angular gyrus (BA 39) of the lateral posterior
parietal cortex (LPPC), whether of events and experiences in the
short-term (Mok, 2012) or the long-term (Andrews-Hana et al.,
2010).
On a fundamental and individual level, real-life creative activ-
ities may be substantially facilitated by spontaneous cognition,
mediated by a subset of the brain’s DMN and operating in the
background as our concentration on the outside world is relaxed.
However, when one is more focused on meeting more explicit and
deliberate response demands such as in a test or timed situation,
the demand for controlled processing may substantially increase,
leading to a suppression of default processing (Mok, 2012). The
differentiation between two processing modes—spontaneous vs.
deliberate—for creative cognition has also been addressed in
Dietrich (2004). More recent evidence is converging to indicate
that creative cognition emerges from everyday cognitive abilities
(Sawyer, 2011). Productive creative cognition may likely be facili-
tated by a delicate balance between more spontaneous processing
vs. more controlled processing, both of which may be experienced
concurrently to the extent that default activity does not become
suppressed due to a substantial demand for controlled processing
(Mok, 2012). In the literature, terms such as daydreaming and
mind-wandering (e.g., Dietrich, 2007; Sawyer, 2011) have been
used to describe mental states conducive to creative cognition.
Such states are known to be mediated by the brain’s DMN. Default
network activity increases when we are asleep or when we are
undisturbed and left to ourselves to daydream and/or mind-
wander (Mason et al., 2007; Buckner et al., 2008). Default-mode
processing reflects the brain’s resting-state activity when our focus
on the external environment is relaxed (Buckner et al., 2008).
This corresponds to cognitive states described by disinhibition or
relaxation of constraints (Dietrich, 2007; Kaufman et al., 2010)
deemed to be facilitative of creativity.
Previously, in a PET study, BA 39 of the LPPC has been impli-
cated in the performance of a verbal creativity task (Bechtereva
et al., 2004). Participants generated a story using a difficult vs.
an easy word list. The difficult list comprised remotely associ-
ated words, whereas the easy list comprised semantically-related
words. Two other task conditions controlled for the syntactic
vs. memory-related aspects of the task. When a task condition
1Components of the multiple-demand network include the pre-
supplementary motor area, the inferior frontal sulcus and the lateral PFC
around it [BA 9], the anterior insula and the intraparietal sulcus (Duncan,
2006). The multiple-demand network has been found to be activated in a
wide range of cognitive activity, from working memory storage/manipulation,
executive control to response selection (Woolgar et al., 2011).
operationalized as requiring a greater degree of creativity to prob-
lem solve was contrasted against a task condition operationalized
as requiring a lesser degree of creativity, at least a left BA 39
region within the LPPC (Cho, 2010) was implicated. A very recent
fMRI study has also implicated the LPPC, including the angular
gyrus, in creative cognition when participants generated alternate
uses, as opposed to ordinary characteristics, for common objects
(Kleibeuker et al., 2013). In a structural neuroanatomical MR
study, a positive correlation has been found between cortical
thickness in a right angular gyral region and self-reported real-life
creative achievements (Jung et al., 2010).
The inconsistent pattern of results in neural studies of cre-
ativity has often been attributed to a lack of psychometrically
sound assessment instruments and/or a definitional issue of the
various concepts under investigation (e.g., Arden et al., 2010;
Dietrich and Kanso, 2010). Below I outline two factors that may
influence the observed results. A key aspect of the experimental
tasks commonly used in neural studies of creativity such as
those based on the AUT and the Torrance Tests is that they are
administered in timed conditions, much like a test situation in
which the participant may feel the stress of having their responses
critically evaluated. Such external task demands may require more
attention and control, leading to an increase in control network
activity and a suppression of default network activity. Plucker
and Makel (2010) have also raised concerns about a timed testing
condition. Moreover, in an unpublished set of data, Mok and
colleagues observed that the MR scanning environment such as
the continuously loud scanner noise may lead to a decrease in
size of experimental effects that are dependent on default network
processing. To cope with the effect of environmental noise, there
may be a greater demand for controlled processing, leading to
a relative suppression of default network activity. These factors
may contribute to why fMRI studies of creativity were in general
rather consistent in implicating the PFC when timed tasks were
used or when a study session felt like a test situation. Studies
employing the EEG methodology with timed task administrations
appeared to have yielded inconsistent results with regard to the
role of frontal regions in creative cognition. The superior tem-
poral resolution of the EEG methodology (1 ms, as opposed to
2 s for fMRI and 40 s for PET; Sawyer, 2011) may have afforded
a greater potential to capture transient task-related activity such
as default network activity, rather than possibly more persistent
control network activity.
It is noteworthy that EEG studies have, in fact, been more
consistent in showing that divergent thinking (measured by the
AUT and/or the Torrance Tests) is associated with strong alpha
activity and alpha synchronization, particularly in the parietal
regions but also in the frontal and central regions (e.g., Fink
et al., 2007, 2009a,b; Grabner et al., 2007). More recent studies
employing simultaneous resting-state EEG/fMRI measurements
have found a positive correlation between blood-oxygen-level
dependent (BOLD) signals in components of the brain’s DMN,
including the LPPC, and global alpha power (Mantini et al.,
2007) and global alpha synchronization (Jann et al., 2009),
respectively. Global measures of alpha activity were based on all
electrode sites (frontal, central, temporal and posterior channels).
Mantini et al. (2007) additionally found global alpha power
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to correlate negatively with an intrinsic connectivity network
more involved in dorsal attention, which included the PFC. This
line of research appears to provide preliminary support for an
association between global alpha synchronization and a state of
mind corresponding to the brain in default mode. In default
mode, active processing in control, and related sensory and motor
brain regions is depressed. This harks back to the traditional
interpretation of alpha synchronization as reflective of “cortical
idling” (Pfurtscheller et al., 1996). A modern interpretation of
alpha synchronization may be that it is related to the brain’s
default-mode processing.
Caution should be exercised in interpreting event-related
alpha synchronization (ERS) as reflective of an inhibitory or top-
down control process (cf. Klimesch et al., 2007). For example,
alpha ERS observed over a short memory delay (1800 ms) in a
working memory scanning task (a modified Sternberg task) has
been interpreted as evidence against cortical idling but reflective
of inhibition of brain areas not being used in processing (Schack
and Klimesch, 2002). On close scrutiny, delay-period memory
processing in this task might have been more spontaneously
experienced than deliberately engaged, for the possibility that the
probe stimulus, presented after the delay, would be contained in
the (memory) set of simple stimuli presented before the delay.
Delay-period memory processing of an (easy to discern) identity
match stimulus may be facilitated, at default processing levels,
concurrently by an LPPC region (for a prospective perspective)
and a hippocampal region (for a retrospective perspective; Mok
et al., 2009; Mok, 2012). When the memory set size was increased,
delay-period ERS over posterior regions was stronger (Jensen
et al., 2002; Schack and Klimesch, 2002). Upon presentation of
the probe, event-related alpha desynchronization was observed
(Klimesch et al., 2007). Participants likely engaged deliberately in
controlled processing as they responded to the probe.
Alpha activity has also been taken as reflective of active inhi-
bition of external sensory information during mental imagery
(e.g., Cooper et al., 2003). More recent fMRI results, however,
have supported the core, modality-independent role of the DMN
in mental imagery (e.g., Mok et al., 2009; Daselaar et al., 2010).
Another paradox was the simultaneous synchronization and
desynchronization of different alpha responses in a recognition
memory task (Klimesch et al., 2000). While transient evoked
alpha synchronization may be observed at parieto-occipital sites,
widespread induced alpha desynchronization may be observed at
most recording sites. More spontaneously experienced cognitive
processing in the LPPC, a DMN region, may co-occur with more
controlled processing (Mok, 2012). The EEG signature of this co-
occurrence warrants further investigation, as does a more system-
atic evaluation of the functional significance of alpha activity in
general for spontaneous cognition mediated by a subset of the
DMN.
A PRELIMINARY UNIFYING PERSPECTIVE AND SOME
DEFINITIONAL ISSUES
As reviewed, the LPPC of the DMN is particularly involved in
spontaneous cognition and it has increasingly been implicated in
creative processing. Spontaneous processing in the LPPC is par-
ticularly of a prospective, or rather future-oriented, perspective.
In the delay task used in Mok (2012), participants experienced
spontaneous delay-period prospection of a cue-unique response
outcome, mediated by the angular gyrus in the LPPC; there
appeared to be individual differences in which hemisphere might
be more involved. In accounting for semantic priming in cognitive
psychology, the presentation of the prime stimulus that precedes
the target stimulus has also been thought to initiate a prospec-
tive memory process, leading to spontaneous semantic spreading
activation (Neely and Keefe, 1989). Divergent thought processes
that underlie creative cognition, elicited by the initial stimulus of
concern, may be quite similar in nature to spontaneous semantic
spreading activation. Such thought processes allow one to access
remote associates, which are important for the generation of
novel possibilities and new associations (Kaufman et al., 2010).
Functional neuroimaging studies have supported the role of the
angular gyrus in a wide range of semantic tasks (e.g., Seghier
et al., 2010). The subregion within the human angular gyrus
most involved in spontaneous prospective memory processing at
default activity level appears to be the posterior subdivision (PGp;
Mok, 2012; Seghier, 2013).
The PFC activated as a part of a control network is well-
poised to facilitate the evaluation and judgment of the social
appropriateness of a novel idea, and the implementation of goal-
directed plans (Dietrich, 2004). These processes will likely tap
into contextual knowledge/memory whether social, cultural or
historical. Depending on the content being processed, additional
circuitries may be activated, e.g., sensory-perceptual cortices and
related neural regions (for sensory-perceptual content such as
visual and/or auditory content), emotional and associated limbic
regions (for affective content), motivational systems (for appet-
itive or aversive content), and motor-related regions (for motor
content). If additional neurocognitive analysis is involved, other
relevant neural circuitries may be activated. Affective and/or
motivational processes may modulate the balance between the
deliberate and spontaneous processing modes and the efficacy
of semantic associative processes (e.g., Shemyakina and Dan’ko,
2004), influencing the quality of ideational complexity vs. the
effectiveness of judgment and implementation processes.
Runco (2010) introduced the notion of optimization and
argued that it allows simplicity and parsimony in conceptualiz-
ing and defining creativity. Productive creative cognition likely
emerges from an optimal balance between deliberate and spon-
taneous cognition. Runco (2010) further suggested that there is
a single capacity, rather than two where one is for originality of
thought and the other is for judiciousness, that underlies creative
processing. On a neurocognitive level, in the service of everyday
activities, this single capacity would correspond to the capacity to
achieve, on a moment to moment basis, optimal balance between
control network activity and default network activity, and optimal
coordination between these respective networks and other brain
regions involved in content processing. Evaluative and judgmental
processes would be optimized to the extent of one’s understanding
of the social, cultural and historical context. Morality and empa-
thy, and how the social brain interacts with other components of
the DMN (Mars et al., 2012) can potentially influence evaluative
and judgmental processes and bear on eventual implementa-
tion of creative endeavors. The moment-to-moment optimization
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of spontaneous vs. controlled processing, whether the moment
serves idea generation, verification or implementation (cf. Wallas,
1926), may be modulated by individual differences such as per-
sonality and intelligence. An empirical question is whether it
would be more viable to define optimization relative to a self-
norm or a population norm.
Novel ideas are rare, or rather deviant from the norm (Runco,
2004). Thought processes such as divergence and free association
that give rise to deviant ideas are productively creative only to the
extent that they are optimal but not excessive (Runco, 2004). The
concept of deviance can be applied to accommodate documented
links between creativity and deviant neurocognitive processes
that underlie certain mental disorders (Kaufman et al., 2010),
altered states of consciousness such as those induced by drugs,
meditation, or long-duration exercise (Dietrich, 2007), and the
“dark-side” of creativity such as the creation of weapons of mass
destruction. Creativity studies with a developmental perspective
(cf. Kleibeuker et al., 2013) should consider the developmental
trajectory of the DMN vs. the control network and their respective
connectivity with other brain regions; and the transition from rel-
atively non-symbolic, language-free, and possibly innate abilities
existing in infancy to symbolic or language-dependent abilities
that may be modifiable and can benefit from training.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND PRACTICE
To better measure default network activity, study sessions that feel
like a test (e.g., with timed administrations) should be reconsid-
ered. Study designs could bias participants toward different levels
of creativity within-subject, carefully matching/controlling for as
many of the other aspects of the experimental task as is possible.
A concurrent-task design could allow for a better estimate of
the relative levels of default network activity vs. control network
activity. The potential influence of the MR scanning environment
on default network suppression should also be systematically
studied.
In the mainstream school system, the assessment of learning
remains critical. A curricular emphasis on an end-product to be
delivered by a certain deadline and its assessment as an outcome
of learning may create a learning environment (akin to a test
situation) that regularly heightens the brain’s control activity and
suppresses default activity. Class activities should not engender
persistent suppression of default processing on the individual
level. Instead, with appropriate structuring and scheduling, more
opportunities could be provided for developing minds and brains
to spontaneously experience default-mode processing. Learning
environments could be designed to enhance and/or maintain
relevant default network activity despite existing external task
demands. An appropriate use of prime stimuli to initiate optimal
spontaneous semantic spreading activation could be a good start-
ing point.
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